Suchergebnisse

Objectives. The competitiveness of the 2008 presidential primaries in both the Republican and Democratic parties has prompted a reconsideration of the role of delegate‐selection rules in influencing the strategic behavior of presidential candidates. Using advertising and candidate state‐visit data from the 2004 and 2008 presidential nominating campaigns, we reexamine the strategies presidential candidates use when competing for the nomination of their party.Methods. Using the Wisconsin Advertising Project Data from 2004 and 2008, we estimate several multiple regressions designed to analyze the factors predicting candidate visits and advertising.Results. We find that, to a large extent, the rules of the game help predict where candidates allocate their political advertising and campaign stops; candidates consider whether a contest is a primary or caucus, they pay attention to how many delegates are at stake, and they consider whether a state's delegate‐allocation method is largely proportional or winner take all. Yet we also find some differences in how the rules influence frontrunners and long‐shot candidates, and we discover how other factors, including a candidate's access to financial resources, influence the allocation of ads and visits.Conclusion. Our findings offer some of the first empirical evidence for the idea that a state's delegate‐allocation method influences candidates' resource‐allocation behavior. That these rules matter at all is somewhat of a surprise given that the delegate‐allocation methods used by states have become more homogenous within each party.

The party coalitions that emerged from the New Deal realignment were defined by race, nationality and ethnicity, religion, region, and social class. In the last decade, the "religious impulse" has become an increas-ingly important aspect of the party coalitions as Republican and Demo-cratic identifiers have become increasingly distinct in terms of their re-ligiosity and religious practice. The paper traces the increasing impor-tance of religiosity and social class as correlates of party identification and argues that the contemporary GOP has a support base that is highly similar to that of conventional Christian Democratic parties. It further suggests that the pattern of issue politics between the parties today is a result of this new cleavage structure.

This article adds to the understanding of participation in presidential primaries by: (1) incorporating the differences in the nature of the nomination contest between the party controlling the presidency and the opposition party, and (2) positing candidate strategy as an important intervening variable through which many of the legal and scheduling factors affect primary turnout. As more rules affect candidate strategy in the in-party while the earliness of the primary influences candidate actions in the out-party, the indirect influences on turnout differ between the two types of contest. The aspects of candidate strategy influencing turnout directly also vary by the types of contest with the number of candidates being important to the out-party and the intensity of campaigning being important to the in-party model.

Under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV), political parties are faced with the strategic problem of matching the number of candidates to their vote total. Running either too many or too few candidates may lose a seat that could otherwise have been won. Many studies have confirmed that Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) solved this strategic problem relatively well and ran close to the optimal number of candidates. Each of these studies makes the standard unitary actor assumption that the LDP can be understood as if it were a single individual maximizing its total number of seats in the Diet. Even though these unitary actor models have produced an impressive account of LDP nomination policy, I argue for an alternative decentralized model based on candidate strategy. The primary mechanism producing the optimal number of LDP candidates per district is not strategic decision-making by the party headquarters, but competition among strategic candidates. Political parties are organizations and therefore capable of unitary action, but parties are also arenas for competition among factions and candidates. The LDP was not a coherent organization but rather an open arena for candidate competition.

If candidates are uncertain about the policy position preferred by the median voter and therefore face the risk of stating an unpopular position, in equilibrium both candidates may prefer to make their positions ambiguous rather than to specify them. The incentives to be ambiguous are further increased if the position announced by one candidate allows the other candidate to estimate the preferences of the voters better.

Political communication strategy is very important in elections, both regional and national elections. Political communication strategies carried out by political parties or candidates include several things such as campaigns and collaboration with community groups. This was done to gain votes from the public. This study aims to determine the political communication strategy of a single candidate in the Wonosobo regional election. This research is qualitative research. The main subjects of this research are the main actors in the 2020 Wonosobo regional elections. The results show that a single candidate continues to carry out political communication strategies. The communication strategy is carried out in several ways including campaigning and also establishing cooperation with community groups. The campaigns carried out are generally in the form of installing banners or billboards, interviews with offline media and electronic media, and also visits to the public area. Meanwhile, collaborating with community groups is carried out by communicating between prospective leaders and group administrators, before finally withdrawing the votes of their members. This strategy success to bring the victory of single candidate on regional election in Wonosobo.

Remarks by President Bush and Senator Kerry, October 1, 2004

Some candidates must already build up its image ahead of time in the process of seeking support and gain much public sympathy. Politicians, as a political communicator, to be able to make an effective political communication with the masses in order to build an image (images buildings), restore the image (image recovery), and maintaining the image (maintenance of image). In an occasion democratic party that is Election legislature that had elapsed, the authors wanted to examine and analyze return strategies Legislative Candidates who have been successful in grabbing power, especially candidates DPRK, political movements and the forces of what he achieved before the democratic party took place, on that occasion the author examines this issue in the province of Aceh Regency of Southwest Aceh District of Manggeng. In this paper, entitled "Political Communication Strategies candidates in the campaign in Southwest Aceh". The author wants to analyze the communication strategies of political candidates Manggeng in the sub-district just ahead Legislative Candidates and what factors influence people's behavior towards lection Manggeng candidates. This paper uses methodology includes a variety of methods and approaches used to achieve the goals and objectives of the study. Planning research methodology should be done regularly. In this study, using a qualitative descriptive study based locally by interviewing respondents, Candidate Legislative and local communities. Analysis of these results ranging from Manggeng Legislative Candidates Political Communication Strategies, Public needs candidates in the campaign, and the phenomenon of the field during the campaign. Most of the communication strategy in the sub-district Manggeng Political candidates have leverage in persuading or influencing the community in its campaign, the form of strategy do the candidates are using billboards, make political meetings with the community, and help distribute the infrastructure according to the needs of society Manggeng. To improve the livelihoods of fellow Muslims would be wonderful in this political strategy we conducted in accordance with good political ethics that has been regulated by the State and which has been set by Islam.

What explains party unity in legislatures? Prior research suggests when candidate selection and electoral rules create incentives for legislators to cultivate a personal vote, party unity should decline. However, previous theories often treat candidate selection rules as exogenous institutions that have independent effects on legislative behavior despite the fact the choice of nomination rules are often an intraparty issue and a key component of partisan electoral strategies. Here, we develop a theory linking candidate selection rules to party unity through the strategic behavior of party leaders. Our main finding is that, under personalized electoral rules, the effects of nomination rules on legislative behavior are conditional on parties' electoral incentives. We test our theory using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, a case where our results are unlikely to be explained by personal vote‐seeking incentives since legislators are banned from seeking reelection.